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13 June 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*USSR--Nuclear Test Ban: (Moscow has withdrawn its offer of two or three on-site inspections to police a ban on nuclear tests.)

(Khrushchev was explicit with Harold Wilson on this point during their conversation of 10 June--the same day that Moscow, Washington, and London announced agreement to hold high-level talks on a test ban in Moscow next month. Khrushchev had implied earlier that he had backed away from his offer of last December. His remark to the British Laborite leader is the first explicit statement to this effect.)

(There was nothing in Khrushchev's remarks, as reported by Wilson to Ambassador Kohler, to support Wilson's public assertions that Khrushchev now is favorably inclined toward a partial test-ban agreement which would not include underground tests. Moscow has consistently rejected such an agreement on the grounds that it would "legalize" underground testing.)

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South Vietnam: (The Diem government's position may become increasingly precarious if pending negotiations with Buddhists fall short of meeting their major demands.)

(Tensions have increased in the past few days as a result of continuing provocations by both sides.)

(While the American Embassy in Saigon believes nothing short of a dramatic, conciliatory gesture by President Diem himself now will resolve the conflict, there has been little to indicate that Diem is prepared to go much beyond earlier concessions offered. Reports persist that some of the Buddhist leadership remains determined to press new demands in an effort to try to bring down the government.)

(The growing internal crisis and criticism from abroad, particularly in Buddhist countries, may be leading to serious disaffection within South Vietnamese government and military circles.)

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NOTES

*UAR-USSR: (The UAR is apparently seeking replacement of Soviet planes, tanks, and other materiel lost during the conflict in Yemen. [redacted]

[redacted] this is the primary purpose of UAR Vice President Amir's current visit to Moscow. Egyptian equipment losses in Yemen probably have been heavy; the USSR complied with a similar Egyptian request made following the 1956 Sinai campaign.) [redacted]

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Turkey: Prime Minister Inonu is reshuffling his cabinet in an attempt to strengthen his tripartite coalition government. The ministers of Justice, Commerce, Communications, Education, and Press, Broadcasting and Tourism are being replaced by representatives of the same political parties their predecessors belonged to. Inclusion of a retired general as one of the new ministers is probably intended to increase the government's acceptability to the military leadership.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(The United States Intelligence Board, on 12 June 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 20-63: "Security Conditions in Western Europe During President Kennedy's Visit (23 June - 3 July 1963)"

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
 Special Counsel to the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic
 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
 The Attorney General
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